








Creating value in pharma through M&A: 














Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in 









Table of contents 
Abstract & Resumo ............................................................................................................. 1 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 1 - Literature review.......................................................................................... 4 
The nature of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Key Developments ............................... 4 
Coming into existence ....................................................................................................... 4 
The growth of the industry ................................................................................................. 4 
Headwinds in the industry .................................................................................................. 6 
M&A motives and value creation ....................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2 - Methodology .............................................................................................. 12 
Chapter 3 - Case-study.................................................................................................. 12 
Growth pharma in question .............................................................................................. 12 
Creating a leading global generics company .................................................................. 13 
Creation of a specialty pharmaceutical powerhouse ..................................................... 16 
New leader, new model ..................................................................................................... 18 
The beginning of Growth pharma .................................................................................... 20 
Transformation to branded growth pharma .................................................................... 24 
Industry overview ............................................................................................................. 25 
Looking ahead  .................................................................................................................. 28 
Exhibits ......................................................................................................................... s0-17 
Chapter 4 - Teaching Notes ............................................................................................ 1 
Objective  ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Suggested Teaching Questions  ........................................................................................ 1 
TQ1  ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
TQ2 ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
TQ3  ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
TQ4  ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
TQ5  ...................................................................................................................................... 9 
TQ6 ..................................................................................................................................... 10 
TQ7 ..................................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 5 - Conclusion, Limitations and suggestions for future research ........ 12 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Limitations of the study .................................................................................................... 14 
Future research ................................................................................................................. 14 






This paper analyses the motives for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the 
pharmaceutical sector and whether these M&A’s create value. In order to give an 
industry perspective and let the reader experience the situation wherein managers of 
pharmaceutical companies operate, a case-study on Watson Pharmaceuticals is 
done. It provides a detailed perspective into the company’s M&A rationale. Through 
the literature review as well as the case-study the changes in the pharmaceutical 
industry are described as well as findings that indicate that shareholder value is 
created through M&A. Finally, similar motives for M&A are uncovered in the case-
study as found in previous studies and current industry changes are described. 
 
Resumo: 
Este trabalho analisa as razões que motivam as fusões e aquisições no setor 
farmacêutico e o reflexo de tais fusões e aquisições na criação de valor. De modo a 
fornecer uma perspectiva industrial e permitir que o leitor experimente a realidade 
na qual os gestores de companhias farmacêuticas operam, foi realizado um estudo 
casuístico da companhia Watson Pharmaceuticals, fornecendo um panorama 
detalhado acerca da lógica de fusões e aquisições da companhia. Por meio da 
análise literária, bem como do estudo casuístico, são descritas as alterações na 
indústria farmacêutica, assim como as conclusões que indicam que a criação de 
valor acionário se dá através das fusões e aquisições. Por fim, razões similares para 
fusões e aquisições são reveladas no estudo casuístico, como visto nos estudos 







Several deals between big pharmaceutical companies have crossed the newspapers 
in the last few years, with as of late (6th of April 2016) the busted deal between 
Pfizer and Allergan. Whenever combinations such as these hit the news, media 
commentators and (self-proclaimed) industry experts comment on the supposed 
benefits and challenges encompassing the new combined corporate entities. Most of 
the world's top pharmaceutical companies (based on sales) since 1995 that 
remained so until 2012 have done so through large acquisition(s) ( (Cha & Lorriman, 
2014). In general, the industry has become much more concentrated throughout the 
years. In 1985 for example, the 10 largest pharmaceuticals based on sales made up 
20 percent of global sales while in 2002 the top 10 global companies contributed 48 
percent of sale (Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2004). Most of the consolidation has 
been achieved through mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Often several revenue 
synergies and cost savings are expected to be achieved, while commentators warn 
for a decrease in research and development (R&D) productivity and the risk of an 
unsuccessfully implemented integration.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry is experiencing notable structural challenges after New 
Molecular Entities (NME's) output has grown only slightly, while costs of R&D 
increased. For example, based on year 2000 price levels, average R&D costs per 
NME based on clinical testing costs increased from $40 million in the 1980s to $280 
million in the 1990s and rising currently (Scherer, Pharmaceutical innovation, 2010). 
While also the introduction of new drug discovery techniques and the emergence of 
the biotechnology industry changed the traditional R&D process. Finally, due to the 
loss off patents on top-selling drugs (so called "blockbusters"), insufficient 
replacement products and increased competition from generics (and indirectly their 
resulting price competition after patent loss) the pharmaceutical industry is changing 
structurally. As a response to these challenges, several pharmaceutical companies 
became involved in M&A in order to overcome the headwinds (Comanor & Scherer, 
2013).   
 
In this paper we aim to outline the historic motives for mergers and acquisitions in 
the pharmaceutical industry and identify factors that potentially increase or decrease 





aim is to clarify the merits and feasibility of an M&A strategy for a Pharmaceutical 
company in comparison to the more traditional R&D based business model. In order 
to uncover this, we first analyze the development of the pharmaceutical sector to 
give a good overview. Secondly, we look into M&A motives given in the past and 
how these relate to value creation, also taking into account traditional M&A theory. 
Finally, through a case study of Watson Pharmaceuticals, a company that has grown 
into a notable player in the pharmaceutical sector through M&A, we gain a more 
practical perspective into the motives and objectives of M&A in the pharmaceutical 
industry and its feasibility in the future.  
 
This paper now proceeds as follows: Chapter 1 provides the literature review, 
Chapter 2 discusses the methodology used, in Chapter 3 the case-study is provided, 
Chapter 4 are the teaching notes and finally in Chapter 5 the conclusion, limitations 







Chapter 1 - Literature Review 
The nature of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Key Developments 
The pharmaceutical industry consists out of several aspects that are important to 
understand the key developments that happened.  
 
Coming into existence 
The industry came into existence towards the end of the nineteenth century as 
sections of European chemical firms (e.g. Bayer, Sandoz and Roche) that used their 
know-how from the chemicals business. US companies (e.g. Merck, Pfizer and Lilly) 
joined in later and depended on European technology until after WWI. They were 
either producing and selling EU over the counter (OTC) drugs with a patent or 
making prescription drugs to sell to pharmacies and hospitals. In this period, there 
was little R&D activity in the sector.  
 
Due to the start of WWII, R&D experienced an uptick. Especially US and UK based 
companies received financing and other resources during and after the war to 
develop drugs such as antibiotics. After the war, national governments started to 
finance national health research programs or programs that benefited the greater 
good (e.g. the National Institute of Health (NIH) in the US or universities). As a result, 
knowledge in the pharmaceutical industry rose drastically but output of new drugs 
remained relatively low (Malerba & Orsenigo, 2015). Since drug manufacturers did 
research by randomly looking through combinations to find something that worked 
without any prior knowledge or reasoning why it should work. As firms started to run 
several similar tests in a large quantity, developed databases of potential fruitful 
molecules and the R&D process become more standardized, new drugs reached the 
market. Due to the little amount of drugs that existed, the ability to patent new drugs 
and growing demand for the drugs coming to market, it became a very profitable 
undertaking. As a result of the large markets available and low amount of new drugs 
coming to market, revenue and growth was centralized in a few products called 
"blockbusters".  
 
The growth of the industry 
Demand was rapidly increasing as a result of higher living standards, growing 





the US and the potential needs new drugs could solve. At the time, generics were 
also not a threat to the branded drugs manufacturers, as until the 1984 Hatch Act 
was passed in 1984 in the US, generic drugs had to undergo a stringent amount of 
clinical trials similar to a new branded product before they reached the market. The 
combination of all these factors caused the pharmaceutical industry to change into a 
R&D intensive, soaring industry. R&D relative to sales increased from 3.7% in 1951 
to roughly 10% in the 60s, while averaging 18% in the pharmaceutical sector 
compared to a mere 4% in the overall  US manufacturing industry during 1988-2001 
(Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2004). Economies of scope and iterative growth of 
knowledge were however little for pharmaceutical companies. As a result, it was 
relatively though to gain a long-term competitive advantage in the R&D process. 
Although successful new drugs launched did give those firms the opportunity to 
invest their resources in future R&D which gave them a higher chance of success in 
the future. Also, due to the nature of drugs, dominance in the market for one drug did 
not benefit presence in other markets except for company reputation. By now, US 
companies had also entered the drug manufacturing market by bringing innovations 
to the market.  
 
In the 1970s, efforts to increase sales and marketing also started to take place. In 
order to make sure drugs on the market were safe and available to everyone if 
required, governments introduced legislation into the market. Regulators designed a 
distinction between drugs which could be sold over the counter and drugs that 
required a prescription from a specialist. This caused the larger pharmaceutical 
companies to invest heavily in R&D and salesforces. As prescription drugs became 
more prevalent, the drug manufacturers started to market their products directly to 
the prescribing specialists with focused marketing & sales personnel. To keep drugs 
affordable to everyone nations also implemented some form of price regulation and 
to remain safety standards high the drug approval process became more stringent. 
In the 1970s, the companies also started to expand beyond their home markets in 
order to lower the costs per unit of their products and spread R&D, sales and 
marketing costs better. Besides international expansion, this was also done through 
licensing and other commercial agreements. In general, the firms benefited more 
direct from the public health research that was done which caused a more 






Towards the 1980s, the biotechnology industry came into existence. The 
developments in themes such as genomics, combinatorial chemistry, and high-
throughput-screening drastically changed the research process and economics of 
drug discovery (Schweizer, 2002). These companies were focused on 
commercializing scientific research with the funding of venture capital investors and 
strong patent protections. They did this by working closely with universities, 
transferring knowledge through academic spin-offs to biotechnology ventures aiming 
to discover potential new products. While the large pharmaceutical companies first 
waited on the sidelines, later they tapped into the knowledge of these biotechnology 
ventures through the creation of alliances and sharing relationships and buy-outs. It 
was necessary to participate in gathering the access to the biotechnology ventures 
knowledge and expertise for  the pharmaceutical companies' survival as it seen as 
competence-destroying move (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) .Due to the capabilities 
and costs associated with being a large pharmaceutical company which was 
vertically integrated, they bought the successful biotechnology ventures to 
commercialize it.  
 
The rise of the biotechnology industry was caused by a change in intellectual 
property rights (IPR). The new legislature slowly coming available in the 1980s 
reduced costs and the timespan of the patent process, extended patent's lives for 
some products and supported non-profit or publicly funded research to apply for 
patents and market the technology.  
 
Headwinds in the industry 
General pharmaceutical products have strong demand because they are often a 
necessity. As result, the industry has a strong foundation, pricing power and is less 
susceptible to recessions (Ganguin & Bilardello, 2005). However, by the 1990s, 
increases in drug prices and growing aging populations caused expenses to the 
pharmaceutical industry to increase and headwinds to arise. As it was becoming a 
growing expense for the public and government, pressure emerged to contain the 
costs. In addition, criticism towards the patent protection systems emerged as it 
focused mostly on R&D for drugs in rich markets that were unaffordable or not 





became an important political topic. Up to the 2000s advances in science and 
technology drove new innovative products to markets. As patents were coming off 
going forward and competition from generic manufacturers was increasing, big 
pharmaceuticals were in need for a new pipeline of successful products. By now, 
R&D productivity was decreasing since the mid 1990s (Malerba & Orsenigo, 2015) 
(see figure 1 below). Instead of focusing solely on internally driven R&D, they started 
to look for other options to fill their pipeline. They did this through M&A and by 
increasingly partnering with biotechnology firms and universities for new research 
through licensing and collaboration and a more focused approach. 
 
Figure 1: Pharmaceutical R&D Productivity Trend  
 
Source: (Upadhyay, 2015) 
 
As the low hanging fruit had already been picked, companies were now attempting to 
discover increasingly difficult drugs but full with cash from past blockbusters they 
were able to buy companies faster than doing the internal research. From 1950 to 
2008, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved 1222 drugs that 
improved the public's health. However, towards the beginning of the 21st century 
costs were increasing quickly (R&D spending increased by roughly 7 percent per 
year (Scherer, R&D costs and productivity in biopharmaceuticals, 2013)), innovation 
was decreasing, competition was increasing and sales growth flattening. The 





producing them are rising exponentially (Munos, 2009). Figure 2 below shows the 
shift in the pharmaceutical industry and the changing skills required to succeed.  
 
Figure 2: Developments in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
Source: (Schweizer, 2002) 
 
M&A motives and value creation 
The main motivation for M&A is that it increases profits and thus shareholder wealth 
(Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & Zulehner, 2003). As pipelines have started to slim 
down, and no new blockbuster products are found to replace revenue streams, M&A 
has often been used as an option in the pharmaceutical industry. There has however 
been a debate whether bidding firms actually gain shareholder value through M&A 
(Bruner, 2002).The big pharmaceutical companies are trying to replace the 
decreasing revenues and internal growth by acquiring competitors with promising 
products in their pipeline (Jarvis, 2010).  Besides from building a pipeline internally or 
through licensing and partnerships, M&A is one of the only options to smoothen 
near-term earnings cycles and improve operational performance next to acquiring 
knowledge and the new capabilities required. It offers the opportunity to run 
combined operations more cost effective, fill uneven or lumpy pipelines, add 





or scope, reductions in excess capacity and removal of inefficiencies. On the other 
side, revenue is enhanced by expanded global reach, a wider set of products, more 
application of winning technologies and the sharing of skills, knowledge and best 
practices (Ravenscraft & Long, 2000). Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson (2004) find 
that large pharmaceutical firms do mergers in response to excess capacity because 
of anticipated patents coming off and gaps in the product pipeline (measured by 
Tobin's Q ratio). One can see the patent-expiration having a similar effect as 
technological or regulatory shocks that prompt mergers in other industries. For small 
firms, mergers serve mostly as an exit strategy for firms in financial distress.  
 
General economic research has listed several reasons for mergers such as 
economies of scale and scope, acquisition of specific assets and the corporate 
control market (Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2004). However, they cannot explain 
the reason they happened in waves historically. Pharmaceutical firms have been 
involved in merger waves since the end of the 20th and start of the 21st century. The 
waves took place in the late 1980s/early 1990s, mid 1990's, start of the 21st century 
and finally the 2010s and changed the industry set-up drastically. Before this period, 
the industry landscape had been relatively stable and not changed drastically. In the 
first M&A wave, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Smith-Kline Beecham merged. The 
second one consisted out of American Home Products combined with Ayerst and 
later Wyeth. Then Glaxo and Wellcome, Pharmacia and Upjohn, Hoechst AG and 
Marion Merrell Dow and Novartis Sandoz. In the third wave Pfizer combined with 
Warner Lambert (Koenig & Mezick, 2004). Finally, more recently in 2009 with the 
large mergers between Pfizer and Wyeth Laboratories and the combination of 
Schering-Plough and Merck and in 2011 the union of Novartis with Alcon and Sanofi-
Aventis and Genzyme, one could opine a new wave has started. Hall (1999) and 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), suggest shocks as a result of technological 
disruption or deregulation efforts specific to industries as reasons that create excess 
capacity or other inefficiencies that cause M&A activity. Their studies however do not 
explain the within-industries pick-ups in M&A activity. As to value creation, Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) find improvements in efficiency as a result of mergers 
and announcement abnormal returns are in line with future expectations of cash 
flows. Hall (1999) finds that firms that have a high inclination to merge, experience a 





Ravenscraft and Long (2000), found positive abnormal returns of 0.59 percent for the 
newly combined firm plus 13.31% and -2.12% for target and bidder firms during the 
period 1985 to 1996 for 65 pharmaceutical deals with a value over $500 million. The 
0.59 percent market value weighted combined company return was however 
insignificant. When looking more specifically at Ravenscraft and Long's sample, one 
sees high significant abnormal returns of 9.84, 4.97 and 7.6 percent for target, bidder 
and combined firms for large horizontal mergers. They define horizontal as being 
M&A between two top thirty pharmaceutical firms. For cross-national mergers, 
returns were also found to be positive and significant.     
 
An often cited reason to oppose mergers in the pharmaceutical industry was 
because research of Comanor (1965) found diseconomies of scale in R&D for 
pharmaceutical companies. The research had been influential in opposing proposed 
mergers such as the Warner Lambert combination with Parke Davis in 1970. 
However, later research by Koenig and Gans (1975) suggested pharmaceutical R&D 
did benefit from economies of scale. Their different conclusions might be derived 
from other measures: Comanor's based on sales while Koenig and Gans looked at 
number of new drugs (NCEs). Schwartzman (1976) concluded similarly that NCEs 
increased with scale. However, Jensen (1987) found no economies of scale and 
later Graves and Langowitz (1993) found diseconomies of scale using a NCE 
approach similar to Koenig and Gans'. Together these studies suggest that 
increases or decreases in R&D productivity as a result of M&A are not yet clear while 
for industry participants it's no reason to stem their M&A activity. Barrret and Capell 
(2002) could not find correlations between the return on investment and size for 
pharmaceutical firms. Finally, more recently Koenig and Mezick (2004) concluded 
that pharmaceutical companies that engaged in M&A activity achieved more 
favorable post-merger R&D productivity scores than before. Regarding biotech 
acquisitions by pharmaceutical companies, Schweizer (2005) find in a limited size 
and scope sample no know-how transfer but the positioning as a center of R&D 
excellence, in essence they want access to the knowledge and R&D capabilities 
within the biotech company. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), suggest that 
pharmaceutical firms with more rapid worsening pipelines and sales are more 






Although the rationale for M&A in the pharmaceutical sector can be made from a 
shareholder's perspective, it could have negative social implications and negative 
influence on the new company's creativity and entrepreneurship. Scale effects, 
improvements in efficiencies and arguably more effective R&D (see the debate 
above) as well as tax inversions (transferring operations to a lower corporate tax 
jurisdiction) will drive shareholder value. However, social implications might be less 
pretty by employee lay-offs and business closures and transfers to other countries. 
Finally, individuality and small team spirit that drives teams plus discovery and 
innovation might be reduced as processes get standardized and departments and 







Chapter 2 - Methodology 
The study is primarily based on qualitative analysis and compilation of secondary 
resources such as annual reports, academic articles, newspaper items, SEC filings, 
Investor presentations, transcripts of investor earnings calls, industry reports, 
transcribed interviews, official company announcements and topic related websites. 
Mostly qualitative research has been done, as it is intended to grasp and explain the 
specific real-life situation in our case study.  
The literature review was constructed with the use of academic literature databases 
and search engines such as Science Direct and Google Scholar.  
The case study was primarily built upon information out of the Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Actavis and Allergan annual report in addition to their official 
company announcements and SEC files. The combination of the gathered data and 
information has been used to develop the case-study and accompanying teaching 
notes. In addition, secondary quantitative data is retrieved from official government 
statistics (e.g. FDA.gov), Industry associations (e.g. PhRMA) and commercial data 
providers (e.g. EvaluatePharma).  An interpretive approach is used to build a holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation in the case-study. The case-
study design should prove to be useful for answering "how" and "why" questions 
(Yin, 2003) , at which we aim in this study.    
 
Chapter 3 - Case-study 
Growth pharma in question 
On Wednesday 6 April 2016 Pfizer Inc. and Allergan plc announced that their $160 
billion merger deal, which would create the world’s largest drugmaker in the world, 
had been terminated. Allergan CEO Brenton Saunders commented as follows:  
“While we are disappointed that the Pfizer transaction will no longer move forward, 
Allergan is poised to deliver strong, sustainable growth built on a set of powerful 
attributes. Leading therapeutic franchises with strong brands across seven 
therapeutic areas provide the foundation for continued strong growth in 2016 and 
beyond. Our pipeline is one of the strongest in the industry, loaded with 70 mid-to-
late stage programs including 14 expected approvals and 16 regulatory submissions 
in 2016 alone.” 1   
                                               
1






Saunders, had made his rise by managing integrations throughout his career in the 
pharmaceutical industry, transforming Actavis (the company’s name preceding the 
acquisition of Allergan) into a top ten global pharmaceutical company. Known as a 
skeptic of in-house drug discovery, he followed his self-coined “growth pharma” 
strategy.  Now, the world’s largest ever healthcare deal to be, was terminated after 
the US treasury department changed a rule that took away many of the tax-based 
benefits of the deal. As the termination basically barred similar future deals, investors 
and the media were wondering how Allergan’s growth story might continue in light of 
some internal and external challenges going forward. 
 
Creating a leading global generics company 
After nearly 24 years at the helm of Watson pharmaceuticals, founder Allen Chao, 
Ph.D.  decided in 2007 to name industry veteran Paul Bisaro as new CEO (Exhibit 5: 
CEO biographies). The leadership change signaled the next phase of the company 
towards “Watson 2.0”. The Watson left by Chao was a well-positioned specialty 
pharmaceutical company, operations consisted out of a broad portfolio of generics, 
brands and distribution in the US and India. The differentiated products in the brand 
portfolio were high-margin products with attractive revenue opportunities. The 
company selected therapeutic areas, such as a growing urology franchise, based on 
growth opportunities and the size of the physician audience. The 27 branded 
products were distributed by roughly 330 sales professionals in two specialized sales 
groups: specialty products (e.g. the urology franchise) and nephrology (Exhibit 1B: 
Key metrics of Allergan). Although only providing for 19% of revenue, these helped 
to offset potential market fluctuations in their broad generics portfolio which 
accounted for the bulk (59%) of Watson’s business (Exhibit 1A: Key financials of 
Allergan). Watson claimed a leader position in oral contraceptives and pain 
management products and boasted 150 product families. It’s focus was primarily on 
complex generics or pharmaceuticals that complemented the existing product lines. 
Most of Watson’s generics were distributed in its key market the US by its Anda 
distribution business to approximately 50000 ship-to locations over 200 suppliers, 
providing the company a direct link to customers in pharmacies and medical buying 
centers worldwide. With the 4th largest distribution operations in the US, the 






Watson 2.0 primarily aimed at growing the company’s international presence through 
offshore expansion via strategic alliances and synergistic acquisitions while 
simultaneously increasing profitability of the branded segment up to a similar 
contribution to earnings as the generics business and enhancing efficiencies 
throughout the company.   
 
In 2009, Bisaro made great inroads towards Watson 2.0 by acquiring generic 
drugmaker Arrow Group for $1.75 billion (Exhibit 2A: Allergan M&A activity), stating:  
“The acquisition of Arrow will mark a significant milestone in realizing our strategic 
vision to expand our global footprint and leverage our assets across many developed 
and emerging markets around the world,"2   
 
The combined company would go from operations in the US, India and China to over 
20 countries, including Arrow’s key markets Canada, France and the UK (Exhibit 3: 
Evolution of countries active). The expanded footprint would allow Watson to market 
its products in many established and emerging countries. While also strengthening 
and diversifying the company’s product portfolio and pipeline. The newly obtained 
global infrastructure and product portfolio had little overlap with Watson’s, creating a 
platform for long-term growth. The now global company marketed roughly 170 
generic and 30 brand product families (focused on Urology and Women’s Health) in 
the US, while offering 250 different products in the UK under Arrow Generics. The 
acquisition also gave entry into Eden Biodesign, a biotechnology company through a 
minority stake, which it acquired completely by January 2010.  
 
In the following two years, Watson reduced its debt and integrated its global 
operations while also investing to expand its product portfolios. In 2011, it 
strengthened its commercial presence and generics portfolio in key European 
markets while adding product development capability with the $562 million 
acquisition of Specifar Pharmaceuticals.  
 "We got the beachhead established but now we needed the firepower to go out and 
expand that beachhead, and that's what this does." - Bisaro3 
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Shortly thereafter the expansion story continued by gaining strong presence in key 
southeast asian markets while vaulting into the number five position for generics in 
Australia through the January 2012 acquisition of the Australian Ascent 
Pharmahealth.   
 
By November 2012, the company became the world’s third-largest generics 
company behind Teva Pharmaceutical and Novartis by a €4.25 billion merger with 
Actavis. The merger allows it to compete more effectively and signified the 
completion of Watson’s transformation to Watson 2.0: a global generic company. It 
also changed its name to Actavis to represent itself worldwide under one 
trademarked and protected name. Bisaro stated the rationale for the merger as 
following: 
“In a single, commercially compelling transaction, we more than double Watson’s 
international access and strengthen our commercial position in key established 
European markets as well as exciting emerging growth markets, including Central 
and Eastern Europe and Russia. The transaction achieves Watson’s stated strategic 
objective of expanding and diversifying our business into a truly global company. 
Once the transaction is completed, approximately 40% of our generic revenues will 
come from markets outside of the U.S.”4 
 
Figure 1: Impact of Watson Pharmaceuticals and Actavis combination   
 
source: Watson pharmaceuticals investor presentation,  (Actavis, 2012) 
                                                                                                                                                  
3
 Watson Pharma buys Greece's Specifar for $562 million, accessed May 2016, Krauskopf (2011) 
4





Actavis as a separate company was well positioned with presence in more than 40 
countries and approximately 1000 products marketed worldwide, added to Watson it 
transformed the company’s commercial position and added complementary products 
to its portfolio and pipeline. The combined company held the top 3 position in 12 
markets and a top 5 position in 16 markets and was active in more than 60 countries.  
 
Creation of a specialty pharmaceutical powerhouse 
The merger also highlighted a shift in strategy to not only play on a global stage but 
also build up a branded drug and biotech business to supplement the less profitable 
generics.  Bisaro stated in a telephone interview: 
“We will be focusing even more heavily on brand acquisitions and brand-licensing 
deals to diversify our business.”5 
 
The strategic objective to become a global specialty pharmaceutical company, set 
five years ago, was achieved. A new goal was to become a premier global specialty 
pharmaceutical by 2018. The merger with Actavis helped towards this objective as it 
broadened the company’s product portfolio and expanded the development pipeline 
(over 185 Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) pending with the FDA). It 
had gained core leadership positions in modified release, solid oral dosage and 
transdermal products into semi-solids, liquids and injectables. Only two months later 
Actavis already followed through on its brand growth strategy with a small bolt-on 
acquisition of Uteron Pharma for $150 million to add to their Women’s Health 
portfolio.  
 
In 2013 Actavis made a bold move towards its new strategic objective with the 
acquisition of Warner Chilcott. Bisaro saw compelling commercial and financial 
benefits in the combination: “The combination of Actavis and Warner Chilcott creates 
a strong specialty brand portfolio focused in therapeutic categories with strong 
growth potential, and is supported by a deep pipeline of development programs”.6  
 
 
                                               
5
 Watson CEO eyes cost cuts, brand growth as Actavis deal closes, accessed May 2016, Station (2012) 
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By combining, he created a powerful global player with a top three position in the US 
specialty pharmaceuticals market that was strong in Women’s Health, 
Gastroenterology, Urology and Dermatology (Exhibit 4A: Therapeutic categories 
evolution). According to investment bank Jefferies analysts the enhancement of 
Actavis’ branded business was very beneficial in this transaction, as the company 
itself had shown relatively little advancements in bolstering its specialty 
pharmaceuticals division. The addition would increase the marketed specialty brands 
products offering by 125% (4B: Branded products pipeline evolution). The acquisition 
would provide the ability for in-licensing opportunities within key therapeutic 
categories and the introduction of a broader portfolio of products to Actavis’ 
worldwide markets, creating better coverage. In the new combination specialty brand 
sales would jump from roughly 7% to 25% in 2013, while reducing the US sales force 
from approximately 1100 professionals to 750. 
 
 
Figure 2: Impact of Actavis & Warner Chilcott combination  
 
Source: Actavis investor presentation, (Actavis, 2013) 
 
In addition to the operational benefits, the combination also relocated headquarters 
to Dublin as an Irish plc. This created a favorable tax structure by lowering the 
company’s tax rate overnight from about 28% to 17%. According to Bisaro, the tax 





What we’re trying to do is level the playing field”7. Industry analysts were happy with 
the incorporation in Ireland, David Maris of BMO Capital Markets was already 
looking towards the future: “the longer-term benefit of a lower tax rate is that it allows 
you to acquire other companies at even better price,”8 expecting more (potentially 
bigger) deals going forward.  
 
To fulfill the desire set by the board to become a premier player in specialty 
pharmaceuticals, the company continued with its biggest deal ever. In 2014 Actavis 
was to acquire Forest Laboratories for $25 billion, combining two of the world’s fast 
specialty pharmaceuticals. Bisaro noted:  
"In addition to being financially and commercially compelling, this transaction 
fundamentally transforms Actavis, positioning it for a new and even more exciting 
future. In five short years, my management team has transformed Watson, and now 
Actavis, from a U.S. generics company to a leader on the global specialty 
pharmaceutical stage.  Brent and his team, in a short period, have made dramatic 
progress in rejuvenating Forest into a leader in North American brands.”9  
 
The acquisition enhanced Actavis’ size and scale in addition to being less focused 
on generics going forward with specialty brand revenues contributing roughly half to 
the combined company's revenue. It also brought Forest’s brand portfolio and 
pipeline to additional markets while creating stronger and new therapeutic 
categories.  
 
New leader, new model 
As part of the combination, CEO Bisaro became executive Chairman while Brent 
Saunders, former CEO of Forest Laboratories, took place as new CEO. Saunders 
had successful experience with integrating and turning-around companies while 
being involved as CEO in two big acquisitions with a combined value of $33,5 billion 
before. According to Bisaro the appointment reflected the increased size and 
complexity of the combined business and the exceptional and complementary 
expertise of both company’s management teams. It was Saunders’ job going forward 
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to integrate Actavis’ generics business with Forest Laboratories’ more specialized 
prescription-drugs operation while also eying for brand drug acquisitions. Saunders 
saw an innovative new model for the global specialty pharmaceutical:  
"Our business model is driven by a broad portfolio of strong brand, generic and OTC 
products, a commitment to development-focused, results oriented research and 
development and the size and scale needed to efficiently and cost-effectively meet 
the needs of our global customer base.  The new Actavis is uniquely positioned to 
deliver exceptional long-term financial performance and expand access to 
pharmaceutical products for patients around the world.” 
 
However, Canaccord Genuity analyst Corey Davis noted that marketing both brand 
and generics on such a balanced scale was not common:  
"Generics are all about being savvy with patent litigation and settlements, [while] 
branded drugs are something else altogether. Generic drugs don't need much 
marketing; price does that, as do relationships with distributors and pharmacies. 
Brands require expensive sales support, focused on physicians and payers--not to 
mention DTC advertising. They are almost polar opposite business models." 10 
 
Saunders started just three months after again with a relatively small $675 million 
bolt-on acquisition of Durata Therapeutics for its DALVANCE product, a targeted 
investment that strengthened Actavis’ emerging infectious disease therapeutic 
category.  Saunders commented: “DALVANCE is a novel antibiotic that can be used 
in multiple sites of care.  It complements our Teflaro product and ceftazidine-
avibactam, currently in late-stage development, which are intended for use in the 
inpatient setting.  DALVANCE is also a highly differentiated product with documented 
efficacy, safety and tolerability, and its acceptance by healthcare providers will be 
enhanced by Actavis' best-in-class commercial infrastructure and complementary 
product line.  With the addition of DALVANCE, we deliver on our commitment to 
build an anti-infective franchise with true scale.”11 
 
The acquisition fitted perfectly in the new business model as the investment could be 
developed to its ultimate potential within Actavis’ infrastructure. With Actavis’ 
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resources, commercial reach and scale DALVANCE gained maximum access to 
patients worldwide. by may 2015, he also expanded the company’s presence in the 
UK generics market in a similar fashion by buying niche generics company Auden 
Mckenzie for $495.9 million. The acquisition gained Actavis the top generic supplier 
spot in the UK and number three place for pharmaceuticals in the UK in general.  
 
The beginning of Growth Pharma 
In 2015, Saunders played white knight in a heated takeover-battle by preventing 
hostile suitor Valeant Pharmaceuticals from taking over Allergan (Exhibit 6: Actavis 
acquisition of Allergan timeline). By acquiring Allergan for $65.6 billion Saunders saw 
“a once-in-a-lifetime, unique opportunity to transform our industry.”12 At the time, 
transaction was the largest recorded transaction ever in the pharmaceutical sector. 
“This acquisition creates the fastest growing and most dynamic growth 
pharmaceutical company in global healthcare, making us one of the world's top 10 
pharmaceutical companies. We will establish an unrivaled foundation for long-term 
growth, anchored by leading, world-class blockbuster franchises and a premier late-
stage pipeline that will accelerate our commitment to build an exceptional, 
sustainable portfolio.”13 said Saunders. The combination doubled the brand segment 
and international revenue and would transform the growth profile to a minimum of 
10% for the foreseeable future. Allergan would add blockbuster franchises in 
Ophthalmology, Neurosciences, and Medical Aesthetics/Dermatology/Plastic 
Surgery which could now be extended to a total of 100 markets. The addition 
strengthened presence notably in Canada, Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin 
America while also adding to China and India. The combination created a 
pharmaceutical giant with an unparalleled growth profile in comparison with other big 
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Figure 3: Impact Actavis & Allergan combination 
 










To reflect the evolution of the company, Saunders decided to adopt Allergan’s name 
for the dynamic new breed of pharmaceutical he had created: "growth pharma". 
Growth pharma was to rival big pharma in size but have considerably higher growth 
margins and Allergan was going to be a leader in this. It was going to achieve this by 
a bigger contribution of branded drugs sales, strong pipeline, highly efficient 
salesforce, sustainable therapeutic brand categories and strong worldwide 
commercial presence.  
 
Saunders wanted Allergan to be Number 1 or number 2 in each core therapeutic 
area. Allergan’s R&D organization focused on late-stage development in its 
therapeutic areas to market durable products that deliver long-term growth. To 
achieve this, it formed an “ecosystem where everybody wants to bring us their ideas, 
their innovations, so that we can continually source new things," Saunders said (see 
figure 4 below). This was part of his newly introduced Open Science model for 
research & development (R&D) wherein innovation would flow into Allergan from the 
healthcare ecosystem (Exhibit 10B: Shift of Pharma innovation ecosystem).  "Over 
the past 15 years, the pharmaceutical innovation ecosystem has shifted. Where 
global pharma companies had previously driven the lion's share of new product 
revenue, now the driving source of innovation is coming from smaller biotechnology 
and specialty pharma companies, as well as academia. Open Science defines our 
position in this new ecosystem – as a magnet for game-changing ideas and 
innovation. We bring these programs into our best-in-class product development and 
commercialization platform to build a sustainable R&D portfolio that enables Allergan 
to continue to be a leader in Growth Pharma. Through our Open Science model, we 
seek to continue to drive strong R&D productivity by delivering innovative therapies 
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Figure 4: Allergan’s Open Science model 
 
Source: Allergan presentation at OIS (Saunders, 2015) 
 
Saunders stressed that his “Open Science” model did not mean he was an opponent 
of R&D in big pharma: “I’m pro-R&D, but I don’t believe that any single company can 
corner the market on innovation in even one therapeutic area. It doesn’t mean they 
shouldn’t do basic research where they have special insights, but even then they 
need to be open to the ideas of others. Innovation in healthcare is more important 
than ever. Other companies have had success with different models based on 
different capabilities, and we applaud every new drug approval.” 15 
 
By recognizing and welcoming great innovations from outside Allergan, he believed 
the company could strategically invest in innovation from outside to increase R&D 
efficiency and fulfill unmet needs for patients (Exhibit 8D: R&D productivity). It 
wanted to be the preferred partner in current and new development collaborations.  
 
As part of Allergan’s “Open Science” model and value creation strategy it acquired 
Kythera Biopharmaceuticals, Naurex and Aquisis in the latter half of 2015 for a 
combined $2.96 billion. The Kythera acquisition added a list of differentiated 
products such as the non-surgical KYBELLA injection (treating double chin) and 
development programs to Allergan’s aesthetics business. Keith Leonard, CEO of 
Kythera saw value joining forces:  
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"Allergan's world-class medical aesthetics, global footprint, history and commitment 
to developing leading aesthetic products makes them ideally suited to realize the 
maximum commercial potential of KYBELLA™."16 
 
Naurex would build on the company’s leadership position in their mental health 
portfolio. Saunders saw to strengthen Allergan’s development pipeline and growth 
while progressing Naurex’s pipeline to commercialization: "Naurex's unique pipeline 
comprises compounds that utilize a new mechanism to target areas of significant 
unmet medical need in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), including severe and/or 
treatment-resistant depression. These highly differentiated compounds will 
immediately bolster our exceptional mental health pipeline."17 
 
Finally, the AqueSys acquisition added to Allergan’s eye care category. David 
Nicholson, president of Global Brand R&D saw AqueSys’ potential: "The XEN45 
program has been shown to provide a robust efficacy profile with minimal side 
effects, and if approved in the U.S., would provide an exciting new treatment option 
for patients, and one that is highly complementary to our ongoing portfolio and 
development programs in this critical treatment area."18  
 
Transformation to branded growth pharma 
While the deals to extend Allergan’s branded drugs portfolio and development 
pipeline were being made and pending in the latter of 2015, it took another bold 
action: the divestiture of Allergan’s global generics business. By selling its generic 
pharmaceuticals business to Teva for $40.5 billion, it would remain as a more 
focused branded growth pharma. The branded business that would remain was 
focused on their seven key therapeutic categories with strong double-digit growth 
prospects (Exhibit 4C: Allergan 2015 core therapeutic areas & new product sales 
estimates) and a solid development pipeline. The brand-focused company would 
reduce operational complexity by going from 40 to 12 plants worldwide and 
magnified its “Open Science” R&D strategy. Saunders’ reasoning was the following:  
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“While we were not actively seeking a buyer for our generics business, Teva 
presented an offer at a very compelling valuation that reflects and recognizes the 
significant value that our global generics team has generated in creating and 
managing a world-class generics business.  As a result of the transaction, we will 
also obtain a minority equity interest in Teva, to share in the upside of the generic 
R&D pipeline we are transferring in this combination."19 
 
The pending transaction was expected to be closed by the first quarter of 2016. 
However, antitrust clearance from mostly EU and US regulatory bodies had delayed 
the progress as Teva had to divest $1 billion in assets in order to proceed. Teva now 
expected it to take until June 2016 as required divestitures in the US were more 
extensive and thus required more time and negotiations with the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) than expected.  
 
Industry overview 
The global pharmaceutical industry can be split up in generic drugs and branded 
drugs manufacturers (Exhibit 7: Top 30 global pharma firms in 2014 and 11B: global 
spending on drug classifications). In general, generics have spent less on R&D than 
branded drugs manufacturers due to their targeting of off-patented drugs. Generics 
accounts for 80% of the prescriptions written in the US drug market and the global 
top 5 generic manufacturers generate 47.4% of global generics sales in 201420.  
 
The global pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant changes during the 
period of Watson’s transformation.The industry, the branded manufacturers faced a 
“patent cliff” from roughly 2010 to 2015 (see Exhibit 8A and 8B) wherein a notable 
amount of successful patented drugs from the 90’s lost their exclusivity, while there 
had been relatively low R&D output (see Exhibit 8E and 8F) and costs per output 
increased. As a result, the bloated cost-structure of most big (branded) pharma 
companies became visible as sales declined (see Exhibit 9: margins of 
comparables). The new stream of patent-expired drugs to come on the market was a 
boon for generic manufacturers (see Exhibit 11A), who depended much more on 
their ability to reach customers through distribution to increase revenues. To capture 
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future growth, pharmaceutical companies had undertaken several measures in the 
last decade to stay relevant in the changing business environment. This was mostly 
accomplished through internal cost-cutting or via M&A. Savings on every expense 
were targeted: sales & marketing, costs of goods sold and even R&D. 
 
The industry increasingly focused on running efficient internal operations to reduce 
costs in anticipation of the patent cliff and increase scale. While the focus was 
initially on internal cost-cutting, towards 2009 it became clear that more extreme 
measures were necessary: in 2003 Schering-Plough lost its patent on the 
blockbuster Caritin and Pfizer failed the product approval of Torcetrapib and launch 
of Exubera in 2006-2007. As a result the firms orchestrated mergers targeting 
synergies of roughly 30% of target expense and 25% in target sales while reducing 
workforce21. 
 
M&A became increasingly important to achieve the company’s goals by expanding 
reach of the current portfolios, grow internationally, deepen or broaden the product 
portfolios and enhance buying power of inputs while simultaneously eliminating 
redundancies in the workforce (see Figure 5 below). In addition, relocating 
headquarters to lower tax-rate countries fueled M&A as it allows enhances net profits 
and future deals. However, valuations were rising as companies were competing for 
targets making it less sustainable (Exhibit 2C: Top pharma M&A deals in 2015 and 
2014). Companies also became increasingly focused, divesting or reducing 
insignificant side operations.  
 
Figure 5: M&A rationale 
 
source: (Wang, 2014) 
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As a result of the decrease in R&D productivity (Exhibit 8C: Declining R&D 
productivity), pharmaceutical companies also started to focus more on certain 
therapeutic categories that fit the company’s legacy business and strength to gain 
leadership in the therapeutic area. By focusing, big pharma could uphold innovation 
leadership in the category and increase the effectiveness of its marketing and 
salesforce. The increased focus on certain categories also contributed to the uptick 
in M&A as big pharma started to pool resources through M&A, licensing and asset 
swaps to create leadership areas.  
 
Specialty pharma companies followed a similar strategy targeting several therapeutic 
areas with a lesser focus given the limited amount of products in the specialty 
pharma industry. Instead of focusing on a few blockbuster products, its salesforce 
offers several (e.g. 5) medium market-size products in a therapeutic area that 
combined give a similar sales potential. Just like big pharma this increased the 
effectiveness and relevance of the marketing and salesforce to customers, although 
less impact of patent expiration.  
 
The source of innovation within the pharmaceutical world had also changed since 
more venture capital firms started to fund biotech startups with innovative R&D 
projects (see Exhibit 10A). While in 1998 big pharma contributed 62% of all New 
Molecular Entities (NME’s) by 2013 this had decreased to 22% (see exhibit 10B). As 
a result of this trend and the hope to acquire innovation at a better cost, several big 
pharma companies started to change their R&D methods from a closed in-house 
model to an open-source or networked model (see Exhibit 8G and 8H). Within this 
model, big pharma taps into external sources for research and development of its 
pipeline. This model gives potential access to more innovations early in the process 












Figure 6: Overview of R&D model on R&D/sales ratio and % pipeline externally sourced 
 
Source: Allergan R&D presentation (Schaison, 2015) 
 
To conclude the industry overview, during the period and even more so in the future, 
the share of prescription drug sales coming from international markets is growing. 
Global prescriptions sales in general are expected to grow by 4,8% per year from 
2014 to make it a $987 billion market by 2020 according to EvaluatePharma (see 
Exhibit 11C). Generics will also continue to grow at a faster pace than branded 
pharmaceutical products. The share of sales coming from biotechnology products 
(bioengineered vaccines and biologics) had also tremendously increased and will 
continue to do so, making up 27% in 2020 according to EvaluatePharma (see Exhibit 
11D). 
 
Looking ahead  
While the $160 billion merger was cancelled, shareholders were wondering what 
Saunders was going to do next. As the supposedly largest deal of 2015, it was 
heavily followed and commented on in the media. By some seen as a deal to 
redomicile Pfizer to Ireland to lower taxes, it sounded the warning bells with 
suggestions similar to this:  
“companies are increasingly pursuing financial engineering to fix troubled core 
businesses, a trend that in previous booms has ended poorly for investors”.22 
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The merger would have brought Pfizer roughly $1.7 billion in tax savings by 2018 
based on analysts’ estimates23. In addition, the media highlighted Allergan’s record 
of employee layoffs in past M&A transactions and was wary that it was not always 
productive for R&D. Firing staff could demotivate the remaining workers and cause 
key researchers to leave. Also, lab productivity didn’t always scale, resulting in a 
lackluster development pipeline.  
 
Shareholders also started to worry about the sustainability of Allergan’s business 
model, as its competitor Valeant Pharmaceutical who from a distance appeared to 
follow a similar playbook, had faltered. Both firms had grown through an acquisitive 
style with less focus on R&D, done tax inversions and increased the prices of drugs. 
Valeant had come in the spotlight after it was accused of fraud at one of its 
distributors, aggressive sales techniques (e.g. channel stuffing) and ludicrous drug 
price hikes. Democrats’ presidential contender Hillary Clinton addressed Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals in her campaign, saying: "This is predatory pricing. It is unjustified. 
It is wrong."  2016 presidential candidates from both sides had addressed drug costs 
in their campaigns making shareholders worried about the future of some 
pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Saunders had proposed the combination with Pfizer as another transformation: “This 
bold action is the next chapter in the successful transformation of Allergan allowing 
us to operate with greater resources at a much bigger scale. Joining forces with 
Pfizer matches our leading products in seven high growth therapeutic areas and our 
robust R&D pipeline with Pfizer’s leading innovative and established businesses, 
vast global footprint and strength in discovery and development research to create a 
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Now that the deal was aborted by mutual agreement after new rules by the US 
treasury department prevented much of the tax benefits for Pfizer, shareholders 
grew more critical towards Allergan’s model of creating value.  
 
Figure 7: Allergan’s shareholder performance and M&A activity from 2007-HY2015 
 
Source: Allergan website; Investor relations, May 2016 
 
Shareholders were wondering how the future would look like. Could Saunders 
replicate the success he had created since 2007 (see figure 7 above)?  Firstly, would 
the company still do large deals in the future now that the US treasury department 
had taken away some of its merits? Was Saunder’s “growth pharma" strategy still 
possible going forward now they were one of the biggest pharmaceutical companies 
based on revenues and market capitalization? Was Allergan’s R&D style sustainable 
going forward or would it shift to the more traditional style? Was the business model 
it had used in the past actually sustainable or would it halt like Valeant’s, especially 
now that Valeant’s supposedly similar practices had come to light in the US 






Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Generics segment (x1000 000)
Net revenues 1.501,9 1.474,3 1.668,2 2.338,4 3.367,2 4.446,1 6355,9 6747,2 6375,3
cost of sales 917,9 883,8 947,1 1.198,9 1.817,8 2.430,9 3294 3198,6 3048,1
R&D generics 102,4 119,2 140,4 194,6 227,7 256,3 425,1 480,2 422,2
Selling and marketing 55,4 55,2 53,8 111,9 156,0 281,2 638,3 679,9 557,7
Generics contribution 426,2 416,1 526,9 833,0 1.165,7 1.477,7 1998,5 2388,5 2347,3
Brands segment
Net revenues 482,7 455,0 461,0 397,8 441,0 482,4 1124,8 4631,4 12835,5
cost of sales 99,9 107,1 89,3 88,4 94,4 116,8 372,2 1649 1607,3
R&D brands 42,4 50,9 56,9 101,5 67,7 146,2 191,8 605,7 2358,5
Selling and marketing 108,0 118,2 144,5 137,8 168,6 175,5 269,5 1057,5 2536,7
Brands contribution 178,4 178,8 170,3 70,1 110,3 43,9 291,3 1319,2 6333
Distribution segment
Net revenues 566,1 606,2 663,8 830,7 776,2 986,4 1196,9 1683,7 2225,4
cost of sales 487,0 511,9 560,4 711,2 652,7 846,6 1024,5 1456,2 1905,3
R&D - - - - - - - - -
Selling and marketing 52,0 59,5 64,8 70,3 77,2 89,8 112,5 112,6 146,9
Distribution contribution 27,1 34,8 38,6 49,2 46,3 50,0 59,9 114,9 173,2
Total contribution 631,7 629,7 735,8 952,3 1.322,3 1.571,6 2349,7 3822,6 6506,2
General and administrative 205,7 190,5 257,1 436,1 353,1 625,3 1027,5 1743,2 3283,7
Amortization 176,4 80,7 92,6 180,0 354,3 481,1 842,7 2597,5 5453,4
asset sales/impairments (6,1) 0,3 2,2 30,8 78,7 149,5 902,7 749,6 783,6
Operating income 255,7 358,2 383,9 305,4 536,2 315,7 -423,2 -1267,7 -3014,5
Total other income (31,5) 0,1 (21,3) (54,8) (80,2) (70,6) -215,2 -444,4 -1415,7
Provision for income taxes 83,2 119,9 140,6 67,3 196,9 146,8 112,7 81,9 1561,9
Net income 141,0 238,4 222,0 184,4 260,9 97,3 -750,4 -1630,2 -2868,3
Net income from discontinued generics operations 6787.7*
Diluted weighted avg. shares outstanding 117,0 117,7 116,4 124,2 126,5 128,4 142,3 219,7 367,8
Financial position
Total assets 3.472,0 3.677,9 5.903,5 5.686,6 6.698,3 14.114,8 22725,9 52529,1 135840,7
Total debt 905,6 877,9 1.457,8 1.016,1 1.033,0 6.433,3 9052 15543,7 42726,2
Total stockholders' equity 1.849,5 2.108,6 3.023,1 3.282,6 3.562,5 3.856,4 9537,1 28335,5 76589,3
*5487.3 in tax  benefit
Exhibits 

































Exhibit 1B: Key metrics of Allergan 2007-2015                                                                          source: company annual reports, presentations & SEC 10-K files 
 
*globally: 126 in 2009, 126 in 2010, 392 in 2011, 2000 in 2012 and 3500 in 2013  **global applications: 145 in 2010 and 175 in 2011*** launched globally: 1000 in 2012, 700 in 2013 and 550 in 2014 












Key metrics: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Generics:
# US generic product families 150 150 170 160 160 250 250 250 n.a
# US sales & marketing professionals generic 25 27 21* 21* 22* n.a* n.a* n.a n.a
# new generic product launches 16 11 8 7 16 13*** 6*** n.a*** n.a
# pending approval (ANDA's) 60 60 100 120 130 185 195 200 200
# new filed ANDA's 21 0 36 30** 30** 0
Branded:
# branded product families 27 27 30 30 30 40 45 80 n.a
# US sales & marketing professionals branded 330 380 350 350 400 430 n.a n.a n.a
# new brand product launches 0 1 2 4 3 1 n.a n.a n.a
# pending approval (NDA's) 0 4 7 3 4 7 14 4 9
# new filed NDA's 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 1
Other:
# SKU 8000 8000 8000 8500 9960 11450 12725 12650 13200
# suppliers 200 200 200 200 360 260 400 340 340
# of employees 5640 5070 5830 6030 6686 17700 19200 21600 31200
# R&D employees 640 670 850 830 990 2000 1775 2070 3700
# countries active 2 2 20 20 20 60 60 60 100
market cap (x1000)**** 3.039,04$ 2.561,27$ 3.891,83$    5.775,44$ 8.189,61$ 10.894,28$ 21.845,18$ 52.880,69$ 103.017,10$ 





Exhibit 2A: Allergan M&A activity from 2009-2015 
 
announced Completed company name value transaction details strategic intent 
17-06-2009 12-02-2009 Arrow Group 
$1.75 
billion 
$1.05 billion cash + $500 million Watson stock  
issued + $200 million preferreds 
- expand commercial footprint - expanded portfolio of 






million €400 million cash 
- expand commercial presence in Europe (notably in 






million AU$375 million cash 
- expand commercial presence in Southeast Asia - Become 
#5 generics company in Australia 
26-04-2012 02-11-2012 Actavis 
$5.5 
billion  €4.15 billion in cash +  €100 million in debt 
- dramatically enhances international presence - expanded 
portfolio & pipeline 
 
23-01-2013 Uteron Pharma 
$150 
million 
$150 million cash + up to $155 in potential future 
milestone payments -expands Women's health products 
20-05-2013 01-10-2013 Warner Chilcott 
$8.5 
billion 
0.16 shares of the combined company for each 
Warner Chilcott share. 
- expands portfolio and pipeline in core areas of women's 
health and urology - adds gastroenterology and dermatology 
to portfolio -Tax savings 
18-02-2014 01-07-2014 Forest Laboratories 
$27.7 
billion $20.6 billion in stock +  $7.1 billion in cash 
- expands and adds to brand portfolio with blockbuster 





million $675 million cash + potential milestone payment 
- expands emerging Infectious Disease portfolio - Leverages 
Actavis' sales and marketing capabilities 
17-11-2014 17-03-2015 Allergan $66 billion 
$129.22 in cash + 0.3683 Actavis share per 
Allergan share 
- Addition and strengthening of branded therapeutic 
categories - expand commercial presence 
26-01-2015 29-05-2015 Auden Mckenzie 
$ 495.9 
million 
$495.9 million in cash and a two year royalty on a 
% of gross profits for a product 







billion $2.1 billion cash 
- addition to Facial Aesthetics brand portfolio - enhances 
long-term growth profile 
26-07-2015 31-08-2015 Naurex Inc. 
$560 
million 
$460 million cash + $100 million potential milestone 
payments 




Allergan Generics  
to Teva Pharma 
$40.5 
billion $33.75 billion cash + $6.75 in Teva shares 
- focus on branded therapeutic areas - Divesture of Allergan 
generics business - raise cash 
03-09-2015 19-10-2015 AqueSys Inc. 
$300 
million $300 million cash + potential milestone payments - Addition to eye care portfolio  
23-11-2015 Failed Pfizer 
$160 
billion 11.3 shares of new co per Allergan share - enhanced growth profile - broadens R&D pipeline 





Exhibit 2B: Pharma annual M&A deal count & value 
 
 
Exhibit 2C: Top pharma M&A deals 2015 & 2014 
 
Top Pharma M&A Deals in 2015 





1 Pharmacyclics AbbVie 26-05-2015 20,8 
2 Hospira Pfizer 03-09-2015 16 
3 Salix Pharmaceuticals 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals 
International 01-04-2015 16 
4 Pall Danaher 31-08-2015 13,6 
5 Synageva Alexion Pharmaceuticals 22-06-2015 8,9 
6 Par Pharmaceuticals Endo International 25-09-2015 8,1 
7 Receptos Celgene 27-08-2015 7,6 
8 NPS Pharmaceuticals Shire 21-02-2015 5,2 
9 Auspex Pharmaceuticals Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 05-05-2015 3,5 
10 ZS Pharma AstraZeneca 17-12-2015 2,7 
   
Total: 102,4 
 
Top Pharma M&A Deals in 2014 





1 Forest Laboratories Actavis 01-07-2014 28 
2 Intermune Roche 29-09-2014 8,3 
3 
Questcor 
Pharmaceuticals Malinckrodt 14-08-2014 5,6 
4 BMS Diabetes Business AstraZeneca 01-02-2014 4,3 
5 ViroPharma Shire 24-01-2014 4,2 
6 Idenix Pharmaceuticals Merck& Co 05-08-2014 3,9 
7 Galderma Nestlé 08-07-2014 3,6 
8 Rottapharm Meda 10-10-2014 3,1 
9 Algeta Bayer 06-03-2014 2,9 
10 Aptalis Holdings Forest Laboratories 03-02-2014 2,9 
      Total: 66,8 
 





Exhibit 3: Evolution of countries active 
 
After Arrow combination 
 

















After Allergan combination 
 






Exhibit 4A: Therapeutic categories evolution 











Product portfolio per Therapeutic Franchise with Forest Laboratories addition: 
 
 
Product portfolio per Therapeutic Franchise with Allergan addition: 
 






Exhibit 4B: Branded products pipeline evolution 
 













Branded pipeline addition by Allergan: 
 
Sources: Allergan Investor Presentations 
 
Exhibit 4C: Allergan 2015 core therapeutic areas & new product sales estimates 
 
Allergan 2015 core therapeutic areas: 
 
 
Allergan peak sales of new products: 
 





Exhibit 5: CEO biographies 
 
Paul M. Bisaro, Executive Chairman of Allergan and the Company’s board of directors 
Paul M. Bisaro served as the Chief Executive Officer of Actavis from 
September 2007 to July 2014. Prior to joining Actavis (then Watson), he 
was President and Chief Operating Officer of Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“Barr”) from 1999 to 2007. Between 1992 and 1999, Mr. Bisaro served as 
General Counsel and from 1997 to 1999 served in various additional 
capacities including Senior Vice President — Strategic Business 
Development at Barr. Prior to joining Barr, he was associated with the law 
firm Winston & Strawn and a predecessor firm, Bishop, Cook, Purcell and 
Reynolds from 1989 to 1992. He also served as a Senior Consultant with 
Arthur Andersen & Co. Mr. Bisaro received his undergraduate degree in 
General Studies from the University of Michigan in 1983 and a Juris Doctor from Catholic 







Brenton L. Saunders, Chief Executive Officer and President of Allergan  
Brenton L. Saunders previously served as Chief Executive Officer and 
President of Forest Laboratories and had served as a Director of Forest 
since 2011. Mr. Saunders has significant healthcare industry expertise 
and a proven track-record leading business transformations and 
integrations. Prior to Forest, he was chief executive officer of Bausch + 
Lomb, a leading global eye health company, serving in this capacity from 
March 2010 until August 2013. Mr. Saunders also held a number of 
leadership positions at Schering-Plough, including the position of 
president of Global Consumer Health Care and was named head of 
integration for the company’s merger with Merck & Co. and for Schering-
Plough’s acquisition of Organon BioSciences. Before joining Schering-Plough, Mr. Saunders 
was a partner and head of Compliance Business Advisory at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. 
Prior to that, he was chief risk officer at Coventry Health Care and senior vice president, 
Compliance, Legal and Regulatory at Home Care Corporation of America. Mr. Saunders 
began his career as chief compliance officer for the Thomas Jefferson University Health 
System. Mr. Saunders serves on the Board of Trustees of the University of Pittsburgh. He is 
also the former Chairman of the New York chapter of the American Heart Association. He is 
a member of the Business Council and PhRMA. Mr. Saunders, 45, earned his MBA from 
Temple University School of Business, his J.D. from Temple University School of Law and 
his bachelor’s degree from the University of Pittsburgh 
 













Exhibit 6: Actavis acquisition of Allergan timeline  






Exhibit 7: Top 30 global pharma firms based on revenue with R&D spent included 





Exhibit 8: Patent expiration and decrease in R&D productivity 
 
8A: Wordwide sales at Risk from Patent Expiration from 2006-2020 
 
Source: EvaluatePharma 2015 report 
 
 
8B: Global blockbusters by Revenue & Patent Expiration 
 
Source: Bioassociate Consulting & Management Ltd powerpoint 
 
8C: Declining R&D Productivity 
 





8D: R&D productivity by # of NME/BLA approvals per $B spent on R&D in 2009-2014 
 
Source: Allergan R&D investor presentation 
 
8E: R&D Developments and spending in US pharma market from 1995-2014 
 
Source: Data from PhrMA and FDA website; US pharma market proxied by PhrMA members 
 
8F: ANDA Approvals by Fiscal Year from 2002-2015 
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8G: Description of traditional and Open innovation model for drug discovery 
 








8H: Clinical pipeline sourcing for top 20 pharmaceuticals in 2014 
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Exhibit 10: Evolved pharmaceutical innovation system 
 











source: Allergan R&D presentation 
 
Exhibit 11: Generic drugs data and trends 
11A: Global Generic market in US$ at ex-manufacturing price 
 









11B: Global spending in 2012 and expected in 2017 on certain drug classifications 
 
source: IMS Health Though Leadership, September 2013 
 
11C: Global prescription sales and estimates from May 2015 onwards to 2020 
 
Source: EvaluatePharma report May 2015 
 
11D: Global prescription & OTC sales in % by technology estimated from May 2015 
onwards to 2020 
 






Chapter 4 - Teaching Notes 
Objective 
The case study aims to clarify the merits of an M&A strategy for a pharmaceutical 
company in comparison to the traditional heavily R&D based business model. The 
case addresses M&A in a format which it is not often done by focusing on M&A as 
part of a business model and as a substitute for R&D in an industry heavily reliant of 
it. In addition, it intends to highlight how Watson Pharmaceuticals evolved from a 
relatively small generics manufacturer towards a global branded pharmaceutical 
player (Allergan) throughout a changing and challenging period for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Finally, it desires to show the increased M&A rationale in 
the sector through the perspective of one company. 
 
Suggested Teaching Questions 
The following questions should guide the students to analyse the case in such a way 
that the teaching objectives are met. An instructor can use these questions for the 
case discussion. With the help of the case and its exhibits, students should be 
capable to give well-thought-out answers or contribute to the case discussion. 
 
1. How did Watson Pharmaceuticals change its strategic position throughout the 
period to remain competitive? 
 
2. What current competitive strategies can be identified in the pharmaceutical 
industry? 
 
3. How does Allergan’s competitive strategy distinguish itself from other 
traditional pharma strategies? 
 
4. Why was there increasingly more M&A activity in the pharmaceutical industry? 
 
5. What key risks can you identify for Allergan? 
 
6. Was Allergan’s strategy successful in creating shareholder value? 
 






TQ1: How did Watson Pharmaceuticals change its strategic position 
throughout the period to remain competitive?   
From its founding in 1983, Watson Pharmaceuticals was engaged as a manufacturer 
and marketer of off-patent (generic) pharmaceuticals. Through organic growth and 
synergistic acquisitions, it had grown into a diversified pharmaceutical company 
primarily active in the US that marketed 27 branded and more than 150 generic 
pharmaceutical products by the end of 2007. In addition to that it also operated a 
distribution division with 8000 stock-keeping units (SKU’s) (see Exhibit 1B for the key 
metrics).  
 
The first major acquisition that started a shift in the company’s strategic position was 
the 2009 acquisition of Arrow Group. It expanded the company’s footprint to more 
than 20 countries, giving it the ability for long-term revenue and profit growth. From 
now on, not only could the company grow by launching new products on the US 
market, but also market current existing and future products on its markets overseas. 
In addition, it offered exposure to emerging countries (see Exhibit 11B), where per 
capita use of medicine would grow and manufacturing could potentially be cheaper.  
 
Figure 1: Ansoff’s growth matrix 
 
Source: www.mindtools.com 
This move was diversifying Watson’s business through several leeways for future 
growth according to the Ansoff Matrix (see figure 1 above).  Instead of growing only 
by market penetration of (mostly) its generics business and product development for 
primarily the US market. Now, it was able to develop new markets for its generics 
and brand products in all the new countries it had access to. The efforts to increase 





activities and competitive prices, also strengthened the efforts and offering in its new 
markets.   
 
Several smaller bolt-on acquisitions such as Specifar Pharmaceuticals and Ascent 
Pharmahealth strengthened the transition towards a global player in generics (see 
Exhibit 2A for the M&A activity and strategic intent). The 2012 merger with Actavis 
completed the strategic repositioning of Watson, a local generics manufacturer 
towards Actavis (the new combined company name). Following the rationale of the 
previous acquisitions towards market development, the company now gained more 
than 40% of generic revenues from outside the US and sold roughly 1000 products 
in more than 40 countries. By now, generics had also climbed to roughly 75% of 
revenues by 2012 (see Exhibit 1A).  
 
As margins on brand products were much higher, Actavis started to reposition itself 
towards a more balanced branded-generics operator delivering more stable revenue 
growth going forward. With the acquisitions of Warner Chilcott and Forest 
Laboratories, the company increased its branded portfolio (see Exhibit 4A & B). With 
Actavis’ global reach and experienced salesforce there was growth potential to offer 
the newly added branded products in more markets by an experienced sales and 
marketing team. The addition of Warner Chilcott for example, expanded the branded 
product offering by 125% and added the Gastroenterology and Dermatology 
therapeutic areas to the portfolio. With the later acquisition of Forest Laboratories, 
the company's brand portfolio now delivered about half of total revenue. The 
company aimed to combine the worldwide reach and efficient distribution of its 
generics business infrastructure with the higher margins available in branded 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
The acquisitions that followed either expanded the generics business or added new 
brand products to the company’s portfolio or pipeline. The most notable was the 
transformative acquisition of Allergan with which it not only strengthened current 
therapeutic categories but added Ophthalmology, Neurosciences and Medical 
Aesthetics while also expanding commercial presence to 100 countries (see figure 3 
from the case-study). The addition doubled the brand segment and international 






Finally, by 2015 the company started repositioned itself towards a pure-play branded 
drugs manufacturer by shedding its generics business built over the past period to 
Teva Pharmaceuticals if US regulators would approve. As a result of the divestiture, 
operations will be less complex, the number of active plants will for example 
decrease by 28. What will remain is a global branded pharmaceuticals company with 
a strong position in seven therapeutic areas.   
 
TQ2: What current competitive strategies can be identified in the 
pharmaceutical industry? 
Although the business environment was gradually changing over time, 
pharmaceutical companies have only recently started to adjust their business models 
towards the new environment. The traditional branded pharma model of betting on 
blockbusters by investing heavily in R&D and the related selling ability is not feasible 
anymore. More and more innovations are coming from other participants than big 
pharma (see Exhibit 10A), patents are coming off (see Exhibit 8B) and the product 
pipeline is relatively empty while the costs of R&D increase (see Exhibit 8C & 8E). 
Instead of doing the integrative approach from R&D up to commercialisation, Big 
pharma will have to focus, as doing everything it self requires too large investments. 
Several shifts in strategy can be identified: 
 
First, the healthcare field is becoming increasingly fragmented as smaller firms 
backed by venture capital are able to dominate small niches. In order to succeed, big 
pharma has to focus on some therapeutic areas of an increasingly fragmented 
market instead of a product and R&D portfolio based solely on legacy business. As a 
result of this, products and R&D pipelines in non-key therapeutic categories are up 
for sale or divested while key therapeutic categories are strengthened by 
acquisitions and licensing deals. This focused approach intends to drive value 
through innovations in a therapeutic area where the pharmaceutical firm is leader. 
Most value in the therapeutic area is derived by the leading company that drives 
innovations in the area the fastest.  An intense legacy R&D focus could be an 






Specialty pharma companies take a more opportunistic approach shifting away from 
the crowded therapeutic areas where several aim for leadership. These firms shift to 
smaller, niche therapeutic areas with a broader selection of products but no or 
relatively less blockbusters. Having a broader focus, they buy the unwanted products 
and pipelines from big pharma that prioritizes therapeutic category leadership 
 
For generic manufacturers, there has not been a drastic shift in strategy. As more 
drugs have come off patents, generic manufacturers continue to deliver an 
alternative generic variant. Low costs, efficiency and expansive distribution networks 
have been more important criteria for success. This has partly been achieved by 
consolidation between generic manufacturers where the focus has been on 
expanding reach and removing duplications in staff and factories.  
 
Finally, branded pharma has been revising and rediscovering its approach to R&D. 
As R&D has become costlier relative to output and pipelines at major drug firms itself 
have become less filled, branded pharma aims to integrate and capture innovations 
in the market earlier. This is done by opening inhouse R&D centers to the market 
and facilitating drug invention (see Exhibit 8G & 8H). By allowing for external 
research and facilitating the development of this inhouse, more innovations and 
value thereof can be captured.  As a result of this, the costs and risks of a drug 
development are more spread out and access to more innovative drugs is achieved. 
This approach has been called an open R&D model wherein the big pharma 
companies team up with universities, venture capital, private equity and early stage 














TQ3: How does Allergan’s competitive strategy distinguish itself from other 
traditional pharma strategies? 
Although Allergan’s strategy had a different focus throughout time, shifting from a 
positioning of generics towards branded drugs, it was primarily achieved by M&A 
throughout the period. Other than big pharma, Allergan has driven its business 
growth strategy and strategic repositioning by successful M&A execution. Instead of 
an R&D driven approach wherein it aims for therapeutic category leadership and 
new blockbusters, it has blossomed by successfully integrating acquisitions. This has 
driven the operations from a US generic focus towards a leading global branded 
pharma by smart acquisitions and disposals. The business is structured in a manner 
that facilitates the integration of new businesses (as well as future divestitures), as a 
result it can quickly adapt to a changing environment.  
 
By focusing on M&A for growth and (future) products, it was able to spend relatively 
less for R&D in comparison to R&D driven pharmaceutical companies (see Exhibit 
7). Throughout the period the company spent a total of $ 5.99 Billion on R&D while it 
paid $114.69 in M&A (see Exhibit 1A & 2A). In addition, the lower corporate taxrate 
gained through Actavis and later Warner Chilcott stimulated an acquisitive strategy 
until this was barred for the future with the Pfizer deal aborted.  
 
The biggest value driver for the company was successful integration of nimble 
acquisitions and resulting increases in operational efficiency while adding companies 
and their products to a global platform. Mitchell and Stafford (2001), also concluded 
this from their research towards increased expected future cashflows after M&A.  
The growth through M&A strategy gave the company the scale, competence and 
reach that is essential for playing on a global stage. The increased revenues from 
synergies and increases in efficiency fueled a growing cashflow for future M&A. In 
the latter stage, it allowed the company to build a strong global presence in several 
therapeutic areas.  
 
As growth through M&A becomes increasingly challenging going forward because of 
the company’s size and competition by other pharmaceutical companies for 
acquisitions, the company developed another novel approach to capture growth 





growth for its branded pharma categories as they recognize that not all (the best) 
innovations come internally (see figure 4 in the case). Allergan utilizes external 
sources and capital to gain new products (in their pipeline) through an open R&D 
model, where their emphasis is on the development of the sourced product 
(pipeline). Not only does this reduce the cost of failure because R&D costs are 
spread over the participants, it also reduces the costs of acquisitions since more 
insight is gained early in the process.  As a result, the company has less competition 
for the sourced product pipeline and a longer leeway for internal growth which 
requires their development operations but reduces the valuation. The open R&D 
model also gives Allergan a broader area to create its product pipeline from with a 
stronger or wider focus while allowing it to leverage its in-house capabilities and the 
commercialisation of products better. 
 
TQ4: Why was there increasingly more M&A activity in the pharmaceutical 
industry? 
Branded pharmaceutical companies faced several challenges in the period 
described throughout the case. These partly drove towards more M&A activity as a 
response to the issues. Firstly, as exhibit 8B shows, pharmaceutical companies were 
facing a so called “patent cliff” wherein many of their top sales drugs were going off 
patent in a relatively short timespan. Revenues were going to decline as their 
blockbuster products were going to be replaced partly by generic comparables and 
prices had to be reduced to compete. Exhibit 8A show the sales at risk for every 
year. As a result of this patent cliff, many companies were reducing costs and 
improving overall efficiency to counter this headwind and remain profitable. By doing 
a smart acquisition, a big pharmaceutical company could in one turn increase its 
product pipeline for the future which would entail more visibility and with less risk 
than internally generated R&D.  
 
In addition, due to some extreme price hikes by several pharmaceutical players, the 
whole sector had come in the spotlight of the 2016 presidential elections. Both 
democrat and republican candidates suggested in their election programs that they 
would reduce the increasing healthcare costs and ban pricing malpractices (e.g. by 
price caps or similar mechanisms).  By growing in size through an acquisition, it 





capabilities, it would also retain higher margins for a longer period if the target has 
patented drugs.  
 
Also, the traditional method of creating value through putting new innovative drugs 
on the market was less effective. Exhibit 8C shows the reduced effectiveness of new 
drug approvals relative to R&D spent. Going forward, improvements to drugs would 
be mostly incremental instead of groundbreaking new drugs.  
 
Finally, many pharmaceutical players did not have the optimal geographic exposure 
for their products or reverse. This created opportunities for market expansion or 
product expansion/diversification. Many established players had relatively small 
operations in the growing emerging markets or exposure to other pharmaceutical 
areas, where the pharmaceutical markets would grow the fastest (see Exhibit 11B & 
11D). These markets are however challenging to navigate through as a branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, as for example emerging markets are heavily 
dominated by generics sales which requires a different corporate focus.  
 
The combination of the challenges mentioned above, put a pressure on the 
traditional branded pharmaceuticals business model and drove them towards M&A, 
next to internal changes, to reposition the company as an effective player. M&A 
could achieve efficiency gains through scale, strengthen therapeutic areas, increase 
the R&D product pipeline, open new markets and gain access to new technology 
(see figure 5 in the case). Besides these internally driven incentives for M&A, the 
urge to participate in consolidation toward therapeutic area leaders, cheap financing 
availability and potential tax inversions also bolstered M&A activity.  See figure 2 














Figure 2: Pharma M&A rationale by categories 2005-2011 
 
Source: BCG website (Kronimus, Nowotnik, Roos, & Stange, 2011) 
 
TQ5: What key risks can you identify for Allergan? 
Several risks can be identified for Allergan’s business taking into account the case-
study and literature review. As a high percentage of Allergan’s revenue comes from 
outside the US, it is subject to geographic risk. This means demographic, economic 
or regulatory changes in the countries wherein it is active could drastically affect 
those markets and thus indirectly Allergan. However, the company mitigates this risk 
by wide diversification over several countries.  
 
Related to the geographic risk, the company’s revenues could be affected by 
fluctuations in the currency exchange rates in the countries wherein it is active. This 
could indirectly influence the company’s profitability and is reduced through 
diversification and currency hedges through derivative contracts.   
 
As a result of Allergan’s acquisitive strategy, the company is subject to integration 
risk of its acquisitions. There could be issues, costs and delays with integrations. 
When an acquisition is not integrated as planned, synergies, cost savings or sales 
growth will not materialize or its operations could decrease value of operations. It 
requires the management’s time and resources to successfully integrate complex 
operations. The management team has however a proven track-record in M&A and 
heavily focused on paying down debt as a result of M&A. The acquisitions have also 






Also, the company’s branded pharmaceutical products can face increased 
competition from generics when the market exclusivity has expired. This could result 
in a decline in revenues when a competing generic product is introduced.  
 
Finally, as any other pharmaceutical company, Allergan is exposed to product 
pipeline risk. The product pipeline could be reduced or delayed by internal issues or 
delayed regulatory approval if not completely rejected. This could negatively affect 
the company’s future revenues as it plans to commercialize these products in the 
pipeline. As the company uses and Open Science R&D model, it is dependent on 
enough quality sources through it, to foster internal development and a product 
pipeline that can deliver growth for the future. Current product portfolio expirations 
are after 2020 giving the company good revenue visibility until then. Pipeline failures 
for top pipeline drugs could however drastically affect the company’s future growth 
potential.  
 
TQ6: Was Allergan’s strategy successful in creating shareholder value? 
The effects of Allergan’s acquisitive growth strategy, coined “growth pharma” by 
management are best recognized through its increases in market value and 
enterprise value during the period (see Exhibit 1B and figure 7 in the case). In a 
period wherein big pharma in general was struggling with revenue growth and 
decreasing margins due to several industry headwinds (e.g. patent cliff, political 
pressure), the company delivered high growth in market values. Margins were also 
better than peers (exhibit 1A and 9) and improved over time, suggesting a good 
operational performance.  
 
The company had done this through smart acquisitions that added products to its 
portfolio and pipeline while delivering these in many markets through its broad 
geographic reach. In addition, acquisitions were effectively integrated and value was 
created by cross-selling, product/market expansion, cost savings and R&D 
optimization. Also, the companies it took over were in general to benefit from tax-
savings due to the company’s domicile in Ireland.  
 
Management has done a smart strategic repositioning of the business towards areas 





opportunities and later towards branded specialty drugs. The sales of its generics 
business to Teva pharmaceuticals proves the company’s nimble M&A strategy, 
divesting at a high value. While the company had paid $114.686 billion in 
acquisitions from 2009 until 2015, enterprise value had increased by $138.139 
billion, as a result they have created $23.45 billion in value and transformed the 
company to a major pharmaceutical player.  
 
TQ7: Is Allergan’s strategy sustainable going forward if not, how should it 
adjust? 
Although tax inversions of which Allergan was a beneficiary will not be possible 
going forward, its acquisitive strategy still has merits. It has a strong product portfolio 
in several therapeutic areas combined with a filled product pipeline for future growth. 
Through acquisitions, Allergan should maintain and increase its future growth 
potential by buying product portfolios that add to their current key therapeutic areas 
or diversify into others where there is potential. Acquisitions should also fill the 
product pipeline for future growth and allow for the ability to create value through its 
marketing & sales and worldwide distribution capabilities and cost synergies. 
 
As a result of tax inversion not anymore being possible in the future, management 
should look more critically towards other synergies and the ability to realize these. 
Allergan’s experience from previous integrations and management’s track record 
adds credibility towards the ability to integrate acquisitions successfully in the future. 
 
Also, as a result of its size acquisitions should be increasingly large in order to make 
impact on Allergan’s business. Since integrating acquisitions and leveraging in-
house capabilities is Allergan’s strength, management made a smart move to divest 
its generics business to Teva pharmaceuticals. Not only did this give the company 
cash to reduce its debt and give it funds for future acquisitions, it also magnifies the 
relative value these acquisitions will deliver relative to the smaller overall business 
size. The branded segment also has higher barriers to entry due to complexity and 
patents while it now is give management’s full attention.  
 
Moreover, it seems that management recognized that doing value creating 





valuations and has adjusted appropriately by sourcing deals more early. They do this 
under Allergan’s Open Science R&D model by partnering early on with many R&D 
bodies and source promising projects or complete pipelines to Allergan relatively 
early on. By doing this, competition is not yet existent or cannot spot the value in the 
project as accurately thereby lowering valuations while also development should still 
be done for a longer period inhouse, thereby reducing acquisition costs.  
 
Finally, one could argue that Allergan has adjusted its growth strategy by focusing on 
branded pharma going forward and sourcing product portfolios and pipelines not only 
through acquisitions but also through its Open Science R&D model going forward. 
This is in line with Allergan’s capabilities and will increase its salesforce productivity. 
The proceeds from the sale of Allergan’s generics business will strengthen the 
branded portfolio where it will have the ability to leverage new products into the 
therapeutic franchises with little additional costs or diversify it.  
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusion, Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Conclusion  
This study has taken an extensive look towards the growth of Watson 
Pharmaceuticals into a leading global pharmaceutical player through an unfamiliar 
business strategy in the pharmaceutical industry. Through the literature review, 
case-study and teaching notes, a better understanding of the pharmaceutical 
industry and specifically about Watson Pharmaceuticals has been acquired.  
 
Through the literature review the emergence and changing environment in the 
pharmaceutical industry is described.  Starting as a relatively small industry at the 
end of the 19th century, soaring from the 1970s and finally slowly experiencing 
headwinds from the 1990s towards today. In addition, the motives for M&A are listed 
such as scale and scope gains, corporate control, global expansion and R&D 
pipeline replacement. With regards to value creation due to M&A, previous research 
concludes that M&A’s deliver abnormal returns for stockholders and that these are in 
line with operational efficiency gains. There is however an ongoing debate of the 
merits of M&A on R&D in the pharmaceutical sector as some studies point to 






When looking specifically at Watson Pharmaceuticals in our case-study, similar 
changes and motives in line with the industry trends are found. First of all, the 
company was active in acquisitions to acquire scope and scale as well as market 
expansion in the earlier phase of the studied period up to the 2012 merger with 
Actavis. From then on, in addition to the previous motives, focus shifted more 
towards the acquisition of branded products and pipelines for their capabilities and 
cross-selling benefits in bigger therapeutic categories. 
 
Through the case-study we find how the shift in innovation is changing the way 
existing pharmaceutical companies operate. As more innovation is coming from 
small players in the industry, the market is becoming increasingly fragmented. As a 
result, large pharmaceutical firms are forming a more focused approach on several 
therapeutic areas which they believe they are leaders in. As a result of this more 
focused approach they aim to maintain category leadership through economies of 
scope and R&D knowledge gains. Others, called specialty pharmaceutical 
companies, take a more opportunistic approach and aim to maintain or grow 
revenues by serving several smaller therapeutic categories and niche markets by 
participating in areas the large pharmaceutical players wish to get out or do not pay 
attention to. In general, a different approach towards R&D is developing wherein the 
large pharmaceutical players open up their in-house R&D departments to allow input 
from outside and in return capture more innovations. Although perhaps too early to 
conclude, it points to increased R&D productivity as a result. 
 
Finally, we believe Watson Pharmaceuticals’ transformation throughout the studied 
period in the case-study to be successful. The company shifted from primarily a US 
generics manufacturer, where scale and reach was becoming more important, 
towards a leading global branded pharmaceutical firm called Allergan. In the process 
it had created approximately $23.45 billion in shareholder value from 2009 until 
2015. It has done this by successfully growing the business towards seven growing 
therapeutic categories with satisfactory product pipelines by M&A. Although tax 
inversion are likely no longer possible, by adjusting its growth strategy to incorporate 
its Open Science R&D model in combination with smart M&A going forward. The 
company has created a sustainable business model leveraging the company's 





Limitations of the study  
Due to time constraints and no response to interview requests in the latter stage of 
the study, no insider’s perspective through an interview has been incorporated into 
the case-study. Furthermore, due to the use of secondary data the study could not 
go into detail towards in which segments or business departments most value was 
created and how exactly. As a result, we see through top-down view the general 
movements but the details are more or less excluded. Also, shareholder value is only 
measured since it can be done quantitatively but arguably value could better be 
measured following a different approach. Finally, by relying on one company only in 
the case-study, the findings could be too company-specific to draw a conclusion from 
them for the industry as a whole. 
 
Future Research 
For future research, it could be interesting to compare the performance of 
pharmaceutical firms that grow primarily through M&A with those that grow mostly by 
internal R&D to market new products. This is possible since due to the success of 
Watson Pharmaceuticals several other smaller pharmaceutical companies such as 
Endo International and Horizon Pharma have followed a growth through M&A 
strategy as well. Also, M&A at other individual companies in the industry could be 
analysed. If a large enough sample can be created, future research could look at 
whether there is one specific shareholder value driver in these type of companies 
which they have in common and research whether it is really the strategic (re-) 
positioning through M&A that drives the value, their efficient management and 
integration of the added companies or something completely different (e.g. tax 
inversions). In addition, it would be interesting to compare the (financial) 
performance and R&D productivity of pharmaceuticals that have an open R&D 
model and those who do not. Finally, a more complete view would be achieved by 
incorporating variant perceptions regarding the impact of M&A in the industry 
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